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In 2005, Maria, 1 a humble and devout woman from rural El Salvador, 
embarked on a clandestine journey to the United States. She made a 
contract with a hometown smuggler, who then subcontracted with a series 
of guides along the route. While under the care of one of those guides, her 
travel party took a van across southern Mexico.2 Confronted with the 
possibility of being stopped by immigration authorities and questioned, 
Maria began to pray and sing for their safe passage. She began timidly at 
first. Upon hearing her shy voice, the guide turned to face her, and 
demanded urgently and unkindly to know what she was doing. When she 
explained, his face broke into a broad smile, and he responded, "Yes! Great 
idea! If they stop us, we will tell them we are a church group." The smuggler, 
faced with the potential for unpredictable traffic inspections by immigration 
authorities, seized on the idea. For the rest of the journey in the van, her 
travel party sang their praises to God loudly alongside their smuggler. 
This encounter between Maria and her smuggler unwittingly generated 
a new survival tactic, one of many novel tactics employed during a 
clandestine journey to evade capture. Encounters between migrants, 
smugglers, and the state are often creative moments. New strategies are 
devised. New trajectories are imagined. New roles are crafted. This 
creativity emerges from their interaction, as people grapple with uncer­
tainty and danger. Maria's mobility, despite the state's attempt to thwart 
her passage, is thus an outcome of a power that neither belongs fully to 
Maria nor to her smuggler, but instead circulates contingent on uncertain 
social moments. 
An analysis of Maria's story, to which we will return later, helps to 
elucidate why attempts to control the US-Mexico boundary have Jong 
1 All names are pseudonyms. All quotes are reconstructed from shorthand taken during 
interviews. We return to Maria's story later in the narrative. 
2 Interview, El Salvador, December 22, 2009. 
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had an ambiguous, and often counterproductive, impact on clandestine 
flows. An unrelenting unauthorized traffic rolls north across the US­
Mexico line. Nevertheless, while a massive allocation of resources to the 
border has not succeeded in stemming the tide of contraband and migra­
tion, it has dramatically reshaped these flows. 3 The geographic focal 
points, 4 modes of transport, protocols, social relationships, and smug­
gling networks5 that underpin routes adapt to policing, and policing, in 
tum, adapts to these adaptations. In the last two decades, border cross­
ings have grown more dangerous for unauthorized migrants, generating a 
new humanitarian crisis at the doorstep of the United States. 6 Thus, the 
border remains porous, but policing has altered crossing practices with 
deleterious consequences for migrants. The exercise of state power has 
collided with a complex transnational social reality, producing cross­
cutting consequences. 
Our chapter explores the ambiguous outcome of this collision across 
the US-Mexico divide. A myopic focus on conventional notions of 
power, or its failure, contributes to perverse border policies and analytical 
shortcomings. Public discourse neglects the protean power evident in 
migrant improvisations, thereby underplaying migrants' agency and vili­
fying smugglers with deleterious consequences for border policy; the 
binary of powerless migrants/victims and powerful smugglers/victimizers 
justifies further escalation of policing to protect both national and human 
security. 7 Furthermore, this discourse also tends toward historical amne­
sia about its own origins, highlighting the supposedly unprecedented 
nature of migration crises and forgetting that the power dynamics evident 
across the border extend back more than a century. Indeed, the starting 
point in most analyses is the past few decades. 
Finally, scholarship generally highlights the failure of border control, 
rather than unpacking its complex consequences from different levels of 
analysis. A broad consensus of scholars focuses on the inevitability that 
border patrol displaces migration to new terrain and social practice, but 
we know less about how exactly this displacement takes place, and how it 
· has varied across place and time. While the fl.ow continues, displacement 
is a disruptive and painful process in the lives of unauthorized migrants. 
On the one hand, migrants endure tremendous precarity and violence, 
and they sometimes die. On the other hand, migrants are not passive 
victims; if they survive the treacherous journey north, their success 
can often be attributed to a combination of fortuitous circumstance, 
3 Andreas 2009. 
4 Eschbach et al. 1999; Cornelius 2001; Madsen 2007; Slack et al. 2016. 
5 Spener 2009. 6 Brigden 2013; Cornelius 2001; Eschbach et al. 1999; Ogren 2007. 
7 Mainwaring 2016. 
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intellectual and physical agility, and social flexibility that emerges within 
encounters with other migrants, smugglers, or state authorities. 
Scholarship has generally left unexplored how these indivi~ creative 
1 moments collectively contribute to displacement. 
Moving beyond traditional conceptualizations of power elucidates 
such moments, and thereby explains the process of displacement over 
time. The lens of protean power reveals the multifaceted roles played, not 
only by traditionally powerful actors like the state and organized crime, 
but also by individual migrants, like Maria,· in concert with the social 
landscape they must cross. Practically, the lens of protean power compli­
cates the binary of victim-villain, and thereby undermines a useful fiction 
to justify border escalation. Analytically, this lens also provides a window 
onto the primary mechanism of displacement: improvisation. 
Thus, this chapter applies the concepts of protean power and control 
power in tracing the evolution of the US-Mexico border enforcement and 
evasion from the nineteenth century to the present. Following the defini­
tion in this volume, protean power is the effect of an imaginative agility, 
which contrasts with traditional notions of power. Protean power navi­
gates a world of uncertainty, where successful responses to danger and/or 
opportunity must rely, to a much greater degree, on improvisation and a 
leap of faith. In contrast, control power is rooted in the capacity to 
manipulate and respond to risk. This capacity presupposes a world of 
rational calculations and knowable probabilities; under those relatively 
predictable conditions, control power can be more effectively utilized to 
incentivize and coerce particular behaviors from other actors. 
Combining a historical perspective with more recent ethnographic 
fieldwork on the experiences of unauthorized Central American migrants, 
the chapter recasts the escalatory spiral of policing and smuggling at the 
border as a collision between worldviews of risk and uncertainty, and 
between protean and control power. The political and bureaucratic thea­
trics that drive border policing are primarily premised on a world of risk. 
Policing measures taken at the border are meant to convey an image of 
control. Smugglers and migrants, however, live in a world of uncertainty, 
as well as risk. 8 Border policing has increased the probability of dangers 
befalling migrants on their journey, but it has also intensified the difficul­
ties of judging that probability. Smugglers' and migrants' experiences 
with and reactions to this hostile and unpredictable environment illus­
trate the agility and adaptation associated with protean power. Thus, the 
chapter provides a micro-foundation for understanding the dynamic 
interaction between the state and unauthorized migration flows. 
8 Brigden 20 I 5. 
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Importantly, we argue that protean power is not an instrument that 
marginalized people can harness to produce "social justice" in any pre­
dictable way. In other words, it is not an effective means to achieve 
collective political goals or to correct the structural inequities and vio­
lence that reproduce the vulnerability of immigrant populations. Migrant 
and smuggler improvisations generate protean power, but cannot direct 
or use it to achieve such goals. Despite the fact that they often prove to 
be capable of resisting and transgressing borders, migrants also experi­
ence policing and violence as profoundly disempowering. Therefore, we 
unpack these consequences for a variety of actors who populate the 
migration corridor into the United States: migrants, smugglers, crime 
bosses, and law enforcers. In conclusion, we caution against a celebration 
of the emancipatory potential of protean power, even as we acknowledge 
and explore its effect. · 
The Ambiguities of Power 
The level of analysis matters crucially for how we understand this ambig­
uous outcome of intensified border policing. On the one hand, we can see 
the resilience of the border crossings when we look at the aggregate. The 
migration stream continues to flow north, simply changing direction and 
adapting to the policing with new clandestine practices. Indeed, at the 
aggregate level, this outcome is easily predictable; the specific form of 
criminal displacement may be unanticipated, but the general pattern is 
expected. It is a policy failure foretold. Accepting the inevitability of this 
general pattern, policymakers have for several decades now pursued border 
policing that pushes migration routes to less visible terrain and practices. 9 
Policymakers traffic in images of control, premised on assumptions of risk 
management. 
On the other hand, migrants may fail to cross the border and, sometimes, 
they die in the attempt. During their journey from their homeland, 
migrants sometimes fall victim to treacherous physical terrain or criminal 
activity, such as kidnappings, extortions, murders, robberies, and rapes. 10 
· Changes in policing often aggravate migrants' exposure to these dangers. 11 
At the level of the individual, the lived experience of the border is very 
different. The individual experience and personal consequences of the 
border are not predictable; migrants must function under both conditions 
of high uncertainty and risk, depending on the situation.12 Migrants also 
experience both risk and uncertainty, feeling buffeted both by increased 
9 Andreas 2009. 10 Brigden 2012; Vogt 2013. 
11 Brigden 2013; Martinez 2011; Ogren 2007. 12 Brigden 2015. 
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probabilities of some dangers and the sheer unpredictability of other dan­
gers. From their perspective, policing and subsequent adjustments in 
smuggling circuits require an improvised response, ad,pting with agility 
to changing conditions. Smugglers and migrants traffic in creative subver­
sions of state control, choosing their conduct based on assumptions of 
uncertainty, as well as risk. 
In the risk scenario, the past experiences of friends and family members 
can offer a reliable guide for future journeys. However, there is little 
stability in the strategic setting of the clandestine route as experienced 
by migrants. 13 The diffusion of survival information renders it suspect 
when criminal predators or state authorities can manipulate it to their 
advantage. A once-trodden path cannot necessarily be safely traversed a 
second time. A once-trusted guide cannot necessarily be relied upon a 
second time. Under these conditions, the trnstworthiness of information 
has an immediate expiration date. In this reality, both migrants and 
smugglers engage in a reflexive and strategic process throughout the 
journey. They do not simply rely on information gleaned at the outset 
of their journey through their existing social networks, but instead impro­
vise new understandings en route. In other words, migrants and smug­
glers, confronted with a mix of experienced risk and uncertainty, as well as 
an underlying context that combines risk and uncertainty, exude an 
extraordinarily malleable protean power. 
Indeed, the level of analysis dictates how we see and experience power 
itself. Control power becomes most apparent when we look from the top 
down. Control power is the primary instrument of organized collective 
actors and institutions. However, when we work at the level of individual 
experience, protean power comes into view, as something that circulates 
among creative individuals. If we view the state itself through the lens of 
practice, we can see how protean power constitutes and compliments the 
exercise of the state's control power, through a myriad of flexible everyday 
actions conducted by state agents and bureaucrats. 14 Frontline border 
patrol agents adapt and innovate on the ground, giving rise to protean 
power that facilitates control. While criminal bosses exercise control 
power over their territory, their henchmen give rise to protean power as 
they implement their orders. In other words, depending on whether we 
look at smuggling gangs and other criminal groups through the lens of an 
organization or as individuals within that organization, different power 
dynamics come into view. In contrast, migrants can be understood only as 
an unchoreographed collection of people engaged in collective practice, 
not even an approximate of a unified actor. Among the actors caught in 
13 Brigden 2015. 14 Gupta 1995; Migdal 2001; 2004: 20-22. 
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this border collision, they are uniquely vulnerable and marginalized, 
depending almost entirely on protean power as a "weapon of the weak." 15 
Thus, this chapter pays close attention to how we view the ambiguous 
consequences of power. · 
The chapter is organized chronologically. We take the reader through 
the collision over time, in order to highlight the dynamic between protean 
and control power. We trace the evolution of border policing policies 
from the late nineteenth century to the present, showing how such poli­
cing has been premised upon assumptions of risk and the projection of an 
image of control. Against this policy backdrop, we juxtapose the innova­
tions of migrants and smugglers as they adapt to changes in policing over 
time. Migrants and their smugglers make assumptions of uncertainty and 
subvert control through improvisation. 
However, the alliance between migrants and their smugglers is often an 
uneasy marriage of convenience and complicated by pressures from other 
criminal actors and the state. While migrants often improvise together 
with their smugglers to achieve the shared goal of clandestine passage, 
migrants also sometimes generate protean power as they resist their 
smugglers. Indeed, the complexity of these relationships requires us to 
disentangle the sometimes compatible, sometimes divergent interests of 
migrants, their smugglers, criminal terrain bosses, and the state. Creative 
moments emerge from actors' negotiation of these complex relationships 
and their contradictions. Border control unwittingly spawns new types of 
criminal characters, who seem to exude both kinds of power to exploit 
migrants. In Mexico, these struggles have culminated in the arrival of 
criminal bosses who more effectively control passage across their territory 
than the state. The existence of multiple actors with cross-cutting inter­
ests and capabilities complicates the effects of power. 
The Collision in Historical Perspective 
The collision between protean and control power across the US- Mexico 
border is hardly new, though it has certainly intensified over time. 16 Many 
of the border dynamics of immigration law eiiforcement and evasion we 
see today can be viewed as representing the latest chapter in an old story 
that dates back at least a century - a story that does not simply repeat 
itself, but nevertheless has a remarkably consistent and recognizable 
theme: through their interaction, protean and control power have stimu­
lated and reinforced each other. Periods of low control power have 
typically also been periods oflow protean power; likewise, as the exercise 
15 Scott 1985. 16 This section draws on Andreas 2013. 
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of control power by the state has increased, so too has the presence of 
protean power. Indeed, protean power is integral to the f\lnctioning of 
control power. Thus, ironically, while seemingly in opposition to each 
other, these two forms of power have also been symbiotic, creating space 
for one another. 
Given all the attention today over the influx of Mexicans and Central 
Americans across the border, it is especially striking that the first 
unauthorized immigrants crossing the border from Mexico viewed by 
US authorities as a problem were actually Chinese. Effons to prohibit 
Chinese immigration in the late nineteenth century mark the beginning of 
the federal government's long and tumultuous history of trying to keep 
out "undesirables." The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 barred the entry 
of Chinese laborers, who until then were mostly coming in by steamship 
to San Francisco. But while this front-door entry was closing, back doors 
were opening, especially via the US-Canada border and the US-Mexico 
border. The federal government had no stand-alone immigration control 
apparatus when the Chinese Exclusion Act was passed, but enforcement 
of the law would stimulate the creation of entirely new federal adminis­
trative capacities. 
The US-Mexico border, long a gateway for smuggled goods, was now 
also becoming a gateway for smuggled people. In 1900, there were just a 
few thousand Chinese in Mexico, but less than a decade later nearly 
60,000 Chinese migrants had departed to Mexico. Some stayed, but the 
United States was a far more attractive destination. 1 7 In his investiga­
tions, US Immigration Inspector Marcus Braun witnessed Chinese arriv­
ing in Mexico and reported that "On their arrival in Mexico, I found them 
to be provided with United States money, not Mexican coins; they had in 
their possession Chinese-English dictionaries; I found them in possession 
of Chinese-American newspapers and of American railroad maps." 18 In 
1907, a US government investigator observed that between twenty and 
fifty Chinese arrived daily in the Mexican border town of Juarez by train, 
but that the Chinese community in the town never grew. As he put it, 
"Chinamen coming to Ciudad Juarez either vanish into thin air or cross 
the border line."19 Foreshadowing future developments, a January 1904 
editorial in the El Paso Herald-Post warned that "If this Chinese immigra­
tion to Mexico continues it will be necessary to run a barb wire fence 
along our side of the Rio Grande." The El Paso immigration inspector 
stated in his 1905 annual report that migrant smuggling is the sole busi­
ness of "perhaps one-third of the Chinese population of El Paso. "20 
17 Ettinger 2009: 99. 18 Quoted in ibid.: 100. 19 Quoted in Lee 2003: 159. 
20 Quoted in Reynolds 1909: 368. 
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Some historians note that border smuggling operations involved cross­
racial business collaborations, with white male smugglers often working 
with Chinese organizers and Mexicans serving as local border guides. A 
1906 law enforcement report on Chinese smuggling noted, "All through 
northern Mexico, along the lines of the railroad, are located so-called 
boarding houses and restaurants, which are the rendezvous of the 
Chinese and their smugglers, and the small towns and villages throughout 
this section are filled with Chinese coolies, whose only occupation seems 
to be lying in wait until arrangements can be perfected for carrying them 
across the border."21 
As US authorities tightened enforcement at urban entry points along 
the California-Mexico border, smugglers shifted to more remote parts of 
the border further east in Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. And this 
provided the rationale to deploy more agents to these border areas (this 
dynamic would repeat itself again at the end of the century). In addition 
to hiring more port inspectors, a force of mounted inspectors was set up to 
patrol the borderline by horseback. As smugglers in later years turned to 
new technologies such as automobiles, officials also pushed for the use of 
the same technologies for border control. 22 
Chinese migrants were not the only ones coming through the back door; 
they were simply at the top of a growing list of "undesirables" that included 
paupers, criminals, prostitutes, "lunatics," "idiots," polygamists, anarchists, 
"in:ibeciles, ,, and contract workers in general.Japanese laborers were banned 
in 1907. Illiterates were banned from entry in 191 7. As seaports became 
more tightly regulated and policed, immigrants who feared being placed in 
one of these excludable categories increasingly turned to the back door. 
Those groups that were disproportionately being turned away at the front­
door ports of entry - among them Lebanese, Greeks, Italians, Slavs from 
the Balkans, and Jews - found Mexico to be a convenient back-door 
alternative. 23 
The popularity of the Mexican back door received a major boost by new 
US restrictions on European immigration through the national origins 
quotas in 19 21 and 1924. Passport rules left over from the First World 
War formalized in the Passport Act of 1918, also now required immi­
grants to secure visas at US consulates abroad. The Mexico smuggling 
route offered a way to sidestep these new numerical restrictions and 
documentation requirements. This sparked alarm in Washington and 
provided political ammunition for calls for more border enforcement. 
The commissioner-general of immigration reported in 1923 that each 
new entry restriction "promoted the alien smuggling industry and 
21 Quoted in Ettinger 2009: 60. 22 Lee 2003: 57-58. 23 Ettinger 2009: 105. 
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furnished new and multiplied incentives to illegal entry. '~24 The commis­
sioner's report the following year predicted that the hhmigration Law of 
1924 "Will result in a further influx of undesirable European aliens to 
Mexico with the sole object in view of affecting illegal entry into the 
United States over the Rio Grande."25 
Local media reports reinforced these concerns. A December 22, 1924 
article in El Paso's Spanish-language newspaper La Patria pointed to the 
booming cross-border business for "contrabandistas de came hwnana" 
("smugglers of human meat") in the wake of the new US immigration 
restrictions.26 The article (with the headline "Foreigners who want to cross 
over to the United States have invaded the city of Juarez") described Juarez 
as a depot for foreigners waiting to enter the United States.27 The US 
Congress greatly expanded the immigration bureau's personnel powers to 
search and arrest along and near the borderline. In a country otherwise 
wary of increasing the power and reach of government, border control was 
clearly one realm where there was a push to bolster federal authority. 
Political pressure had been building up for a number of years to create a 
uniformed border patrol force. The US Border Patrol was formed in 1924 
with a S 1 million budget and a total force of some 450 officers. Its primary 
mission was to keep out illegal immigrants, especially the smuggling of 
Europeans. Wesley Stile, one of the first border patrol agents hired in the 
summer of 1924, later recalled, "the thing that established the Border 
Patrol was the influx of European aliens." Border patrolmen "didn't pay 
much attention to the Mexicans" because they were considered merely 
cheap seasonal farm labor that returned to Mexico when no longer 
needed. 28 This meant that the growing influx of unauthorized Mexican 
workers was largely tolerated and overlooked - at least for the time being. 
For Mexicans, crossing the border illegally was relatively simple and 
largely ignored - successful entry did not require much creative agility. 
Up to half a million Mexicans may have come to the United States in the 
first decade of the century. The Mexican Revolution, US labor shortages 
during the First World War, and the continued expansion of agriculture 
in the southwest fueled a further influx. There was a growing disconnect 
between the formal entry rules handed down from a distant capital and 
the realities, needs, and practices along the border. In other words, the 
"control power" called for in national immigration laws did not translate 
into its application on the ground. 
As a substitute for European and Asian workers, employers considered 
Mexicans an ideal labor force: flexible, compliant, and temporary - or so 
24 Quoted in Siener 2008: 60. 25 Quoted in McCullough 1992: 51-52. 
26 Quoted in ibid.: 6. 27 Ibid.: 230-31. . 28 Quoted in Ettinger 2009: 162. 
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it seemed at the time. Millions of unauthorized Mexican migrants would 
eventually settle in the United States, becoming a vital source oflabor for 
agriculture and other sectors of the economy but also the main rationale 
for more intensive border enforcement. It was not until 1929 that US 
border inspectors even made any real effort to regulate the entry of 
Mexican nationals; even as late as the 1980s, border controls remained 
at token levels. US Border Patrol agents could cover only about 10 
percent of the nearly 2,000-mile border, and most of those apprehended 
were simply sent back across the line to try again. Most smugglers caught 
were simply let go, and those who were not were charged with a 
misdemeanor. 29 
Anemic enforcement (a bare minimum exercise of control power) 
meant that illegal entry across the border remained a relatively simple 
and inexpensive activity: migrants either smuggled themselves across the 
border or hired a local coyote. The use of a professional smuggler 
remained more of a convenience than a necessity. Hiring the services of 
a smuggler generally meant a faster and safer trip across the line. Use of a 
smuggler did involve personal risks (there was the potential for theft and 
physical abuse), but attempting the border crossing without such help 
increased the likelihood of assault by border bandits and abuse by 
authorities. 
The long if uneasy border equilibrium between relatively low levels of 
control power and protean power became unsustainable in the midst of a 
growing domestic anti-immigrant backlash that culminated in the 1990s, 
with California (home to an estimated half of the nation's unauthorized 
migrant population) at the epicenter. Just as the late nineteenth-century 
backlash against Chinese immigrants began in California, so too did the 
backlash against Mexican immigrants in the late twentieth century - with 
the fallout spreading across the entire border. 
In the heated early and mid- l 990s policy debates about illegal immigra­
tion and a seemingly "out of control" border, in which politicians from 
across the political spectrum were scrambling to outdo each other in 
proposing tough new immigration-control measures, the federal govern­
ment launched a high-profile border enforcement crackdown. Long 
viewed as the neglected stepchild of the Department of Justice, the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) suddenly became one of 
the fastest-growing federal agencies. The INS budget grew from Sl.5 
billion in fiscal year 1993 to S4 billion in fiscal year 1999, with border 
enforcement by far the single largest line item. The size of the Border Patrol 
more than doubled along the border by the end of the decade. The new 
29 Andreas 2013: 415. 
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border enforcement campaign also included an influx of new equipment, 
ranging from night-vision scopes and low-light TV cameras to ground 
sensors, helicopters, and all-terrain vehicles. The military also played a 
supporting role by assisting with the operation of night scopes, motion 
sensors, and communications equipment, as well as buil~g and main-
taining roads and fences. 30 ( 
Congress assured that the border build-up would continue by passing 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996. The sweeping law sharply increased the penalties against migrant 
smugglers, and authorized the hiring of 1,000 Border Patrol agents a year, 
reaching a total force of more than I°0,000 by 2001. Most of these agents 
would be deployed to the most popular urban entry points for unauthor­
ized migration, such as El Paso and San Diego, with the goal of disrupting 
and deterring the flow. Left out of this immigration-control offensive was 
any meaningful focus on workplace controls - in other words, the appli­
cation of "control power" was highly selective and focused. It was highly 
visible, but also extremely thin. 
Not surprisingly, tighter border controls in El Paso and San Diego 
pushed migrants to attempt entry elsewhere along the border. These 
shifts in human traffic, in turn, generated further political pressures and 
bureaucratic rationale to geographically expand the border-policing cam­
paign. Consequently, a Border Patrol force that had already more than 
doubled in the 1990s more than doubled again in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century. 
In order to cross a now much more intensively patrolled border suc­
cessfully, migrants increasingly turned to professional smugglers. As INS 
commissioner Doris Meisner acknowledged, "as we improve our enforce­
ment, we increase the smuggling of aliens that occurs, because it is harder 
to cross and so therefore people tum more and more to smugglers. "31 
And as the risks and smuggling fees jumped (from hundreds of dollars to 
thousands of dollars per crossing), smuggling became a much more 
organized and sophisticated business. Breaking up the traditional routes 
and methods of clandestine entry turned the once relatively simple illegal 
act of entry without inspection into a more complex underground web of 
illegality. Put differently, the greater control power exercised by the state 
made migrants more dependent on protean power and smugglers. 
In tum, US officials went to great lengths to portray migrants as the 
victims of smugglers, and they used this both to deflect criticism and to 
provide a further rationale to crack down on smuggling. But this was 
a much too simple and convenient a characterization of smugglers. 
30 Andreas 2013: 301. 31 Quoted in Andreas 2013: 305. 
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Migrants generally viewed smugglers as simply a "necessary evil," a 
clandestine business transaction in which they willingly engaged to 
evade the expanding border enforcement net. Within Mexico, many 
considered migrant smuggling a shady business, but one that was provid­
ing a high-demand service. Smugglers could be abusive and reckless, and 
their efforts to bypass law enforcement could place migrants at great risk; 
hundreds were dying every year in trying to cross the border in the harsh 
and remote terrain where border enforcement was thinnest. Yet smug-· 
glers were hired precisely because they generally provided a safer, faster, 
and more reliable border-crossing experience. 
Smugglers also became more skilled as border enforcement became 
more intensive: Although some of the local freelance entrepreneurs who 
once dominated migrant smuggling along the border were being squeezed 
out by the border-enforcement offensive, they were replaced by better 
organized and more skilled migrant-smuggling organizations. This, in 
tum, was used to justify tougher laws and tougher enforcement. The 
number of smugglers being prosecuted mushroomed, and more punitive 
sentencing guidelines significantly increased the length of prison terms for 
smugglers. But this did not translate into a shortage of smugglers. More 
risks translated into higher smuggling fees. And as the risks for smuggling 
rose, so too did the incentive for smugglers to use more dangerous 
methods to avoid law enforcement. 
The Lived Experience of Today's Collision 
~s we have seen, although the collision between protean and control 
power along the US-Mexico divide is not new, it has intensified. 
Contemporary relationships between the state, migrants, smugglers, 
and criminal terrain bosses are the~selves an outcome of over a century 
of these power collisions at the US border. However, the latest chapter of 
this old story further complicates simple narratives about the interactions 
of these actors and their relative power. Drawing on ethnographic mate­
rials collected in a study of clandestine Central American migration to the 
United States, 32 we trace the power dynamics within these relationships. 
This tracing reveals the sometimes contradictory and sometimes symbio­
tic connections between protean and control power. It also reveals the 
lived contradictions of protean power, · as experienced by migrants 
themselves. 
The on-the-ground experience of the US government control agenda is a 
story of protean power. The everyday practice of policy implementation 
32 Brigden 2013. 
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requires discretion and deft maneuvers on the part of the street-level 
bureaucrats. 33 Border control is not an exception to this general rule; it 
too generates protean power. Routines must be adapted to a lived reality, 
or they are rendered useless; patrols cannot keep as~ schedule and 
unchanging route without becoming predictable and easy to evade by 
smugglers. Frontline immigration agents must rely on discretion,34 their 
wits, innovations and improvisations on protocols and stereotypes35 to 
adapt to unforeseen events at the border. 36 A border official explained the 
gut feeling that develops with experience, "But people develop a sense. 
It's like at the border. The agents can see a car coming from half a mile 
away: Maybe the mannerisms are just not right. It's just that something 
doesn't feel right. The agents have a difficult time articulating the prob­
able cause. They just know who to stop." After further questioning, the 
border official explained that, "In law enforcement, we call it profiling. "37 
Indeed, the US courts implicitly recognize the necessary role of protean 
power, by granting border patrol agents greater discretion in their job 
than any other law enforcement agent. 38 In order to empower them to 
make judgments and act on their wits at the border, the courts have 
defined stan_dards for probable cause loosely for US Border Patrol. As 
the state attempts to increase its control power at the border, this discre­
tion, which creates a space for border agents to exercise their protean 
power, plays an increasingly vital role in the national security agenda. 
In response to the increased control power exercised by the state, 
smugglers and migrants generate a collective protean power. Indeed, 
smugglers and migrants sometimes co-improvise migration strategies to 
achieve their common objectives. The most reputable smugglers behave 
as service providers, treating migrants as valued customers, protecting 
them from criminal predators, or settling disputes among travel compa­
nions. In tum, migrants generally agree to keep the smuggler's identity 
secret if they are apprehended by border patrol. For their part, experi­
enced migrants may be called upon to assist smugglers, helping to guide 
or maintain order in the travel group. Indeed, the boundary between 
smuggler and migrant may be blurred, when these migrants accept travel 
discounts, receive upgraded treatment, or other payments for such aux­
iliary support. Experienced migrants may begin to work as guides. 
Sometimes migrants co-innovate new migration tactics. As Maria's 
33 Lipsky 2010. 34 Bouchard and Carroll 2002; Salter 2008: 370. 
35 Gilboy 1 991; Heyman 2009. 
36 Interview, El Salvador, September 2, 2010, also quoted in Brigden 2016. 
37 Quoted in Brigden 2016. 
38 On the role of discretion in the performance of Canadian state sovereignty, see Salter 
2008:368-70. . 
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story from the introduction illustrates, collective brainstorming or 
migrant-smuggler partnerships to devise new ways around unexpected 
barriers to mobility are not uncommon. 
When Maria and her smuggler had devised the plan to sing gospel, she 
and her companions did not know that rar greater dangers awaited them 
in northern Mexico. At a point just north of Puebla, Maria's guide slipped 
into the secret compartment alongside the migrants. If stopped, he would 
pass as one of them, and they had all sworn to protect his identity. His 
decision to conceal himself among loyal clients proved to be fortuitous. A 
new guide drove the banana truck in which they were hidden. Squatting 
in these cramped quarters in the hidden compartment, Maria heard the 
three gunshots that killed the driver. They had been stopped by a heavily 
armed group of bandits, dressed in black. Based on their paramilitary 
appearance and ruthless behavior, Maria presumed these men and 
women to be the Zetas. Having recently taken control of the territory, 
this criminal group had not received the appropriate passage fee from the 
Salvadoran smugglers. Thus, the bandits kidnapped the migrants and 
held them until family members or friends paid for their delivery. And the 
bandits began to negotiate with Maria's hometown smuggler for a more 
regular fee to cross their territory. The kidnappers treated Maria and her 
travel companions harshly, but Maria was fortunate because this criminal 
group delivered her to New York in exchange for the smuggling payment. 
Every year thousands of migrants are not so lucky; kidnappers often 
release migrants in Mexico, rather than the United States, or turn them 
o_ver to Mexican migration authorities for deportation after receiving 
ransoms. Sometimes they keep their victims indefinitely, breaking pro­
mises and demanding ever more money from desperate family members. 
Luckily for Maria, she arrived and lived in New York for several years, 
before returning home to El Salvador as a local success story. She saved 
the money to build her dream home and open a restaurant near the center 
of town, until extortion demands and threats from a Salvadoran street 
gang forced her to migrate a second time. 
When Maria made the return journey to the United States in 201 0, she 
contracted with the same hometown smuggler for the second passage 
from El Salvador to New York. She did so despite the killing of the guide 
he had subcontracted and her subsequent kidnapping during the first 
journey. However, Maria made this choice of smuggling service provider 
not primarily to avoid US border agents or Mexican migration authori­
ties, but because the hometown smuggler probably knew which criminals 
to pay to cross Mexico safely. She was primarily frightene~ of the Zetas 
drug-trafficking organization operating in Mexico, which had acquired 
infamy for their kidnapping of migrants for ransom. Ultimately, Maria 
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and her family crossed Mexico, but were captured by the US border 
patrol. 
They_ immediately filed an asylum claim based on the criminal gang­
based persecution they had suffered in El Salvador,~ this claim was 
eventually granted. Indeed, an increasing number of Central Americans 
turn themselves in to US border agents or allow themselves to be 
captured in order to file asylum claims. Some smugglers instruct their 
clients to do so, improvising upon the legal resources made available to 
migrants by the state. While many of these claims are in fact well­
founded asylum cases, smugglers and migrants nevertheless deftly 
leverage the state's own institutions against its control power. Thus, 
the "cracks and contradictions" of institutions (Reus-Smit, Chapter 3, 
pp. 60, 61, 66, 68) provide opponunities for improvisation and innova­
tion; in this case, borders and the refugee protection regime collide, 
demonstrating how, at the right moment, migrants and smugglers can 
exploit the nexus of "co-existing, overlapping, but often discordant 
singular institutions" (Reus-Smit, Chapter 3, p. 61). 
In the contemporary context of the escalation of the Mexican drug war 
(post-2006), Central American migrants like Maria no longer only pay 
smugglers to resist the control power of the state. Instead, these migrants 
also pay smugglers to help them negotiate a perilous passage across 
territory controlled by Mexican criminal terrain bosses. For Central 
Americans, the danger of Mexican criminal terrain bosses is the primary 
motivation for contracting a smuggler. Well-informed migrants often pay 
.smugglers not because they know their way around US border patrol 
effons, but because their smugglers know which criminal to pay for safe 
passage. 39 As explained by one migrant, "A good coyote is well con­
nected; he knows who and how to bribe. ,,4o The control power of 
Mexican criminal territory bosses, who extort crossing fees from both 
migrants and smugglers, guarantees that the profession of smuggling will 
remain profitable. This shift in control to criminal territory bosses illus­
trates the dynamic between control and protean power over time, and it 
signals how actors may be impacted by multiple forms of power depend­
ing on which relationship they engage. 
When the drug war erupted spectacularly in 2006, Mexican territory 
began to change hands quickly and without warning among competing 
criminal gangs. The Mexican crime groups splintered with fighting 
between and within. These gangs began to kidnap northbound migrants 
for profit. They also kidnapped migrants to renegotiate passage fees with 
Central American human smugglers. The fees for criminal crossing 
39 Brigden 2015. 40 Interview, El Salvador, January 24, 2010. 
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increased in tandem with the intensification of violence, rapid shifts in 
criminal control, the breaking of old business protocols, and the fragmen­
tation of terrain among competing gangs. 
At the same time, beginning in the aftermath of September 11 and 
continuing into the present, bilateral US-Mexican cooperation for con­
traband interdiction has intensified.41 Most recently, in 2014, Mexico 
launched a reinvigorated "Plan Sur" primarily policing the southern train 
routes that the poorest and most vulnerable migrants often board like 
hobos to get to the United States. To give a sense of the magnitude of this 
policing effort, the number of Central Americans deported from Mexico 
has exceeded the number deported from the United States. 42 Such immi­
gration enforcement operations have made migrants ever-more reliant on 
hiring smugglers for successful arrival in the United States. 
Despite this massive Mexican enforcement campaign, as well as ongoing 
fighting within and between gangs, criminals have proven to be more adept 
at controlling clandestine traffic through their territory than the state. 
Working through both civilian informants and corrupt state officials, 
their intelligence networks actively identify smugglers and migrants who 
have not paid the requisite passage fee. The efficiency of these stealthy 
networks is legendary among migrants, who sometimes whisper about the 
spies who travel alongside them to collect information for criminals. Even if 
US border enforcement were to disappear, human smuggling would now 
persist as a profession, because migrants - especially non-Mexican 
migrants - need the smugglers' contacts to negotiate passage across crim­
inal terrain. Ironically, Mexican criminal bosses generate protean power; 
they deftly manipulate expansive social networks, fluid shifting alliances, 
the recruitment of former soldiers and police with counterinsurgency skills, 
violent stagecraft and message murders that project an intimidating repu­
tation, and other flexible tactics. In ·so doing, the Mexican criminal bosses 
impose greater control power along smuggling routes than do states. · 
The ruthlessness of the Mexican criminal bosses is infamous by design, 
not unlike modern-day terrorist organizations that capitalize on their 
violent and powerful image with carefully publicized acts (Mendelsohn, 
Chapter 9). As the drug war has intensified during the past decade, 
criminal groups have employed increasingly brutal methods to extract 
money from Central American smugglers and their migrant clients. 
Capture by border patrol may force migrants to begin the journey again, 
a terrible prospect after coming so far from home. For migrants with 
criminal records or multiple crossing attempts, capture by the border 
41 Casillas 2007; Isaacson and Meyer 2014. 
42 Dominguez Villegas and Rietig 2015; Lohrnuller 2015. 
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patrol may even be punished with a lengthy prison sentence. However, 
these consequences pale in comparison with the torture, trafficking, rape, 
ransom demands, and, sometimes, murders that occur at the hands of 
Mexican criminal territory bosses, such as the Zetas dr-the so-caUed "Gulf 
cartel.'' Ransoms generally cost migrants' families thousands of dollars, 
often money that had been borrowed to pay smugglers for the delivery of 
migrants in the United States. Without the migrant to work off the debt in 
the United States, immigrant families that pay these ransoms may be left 
financially destitute. To extract sufficient information to make these 
ransom demands or to intimidate migrants into submission, kidnappers 
sometimes cut off their victim's fingers or beat them with wooden boards. 
Female migrants may be trafficked for sex work rather than ransomed. 
Conditions in the drop houses where migrants are held for ransom can 
only be described as deplorable. When thinking about making a clandes­
tine journey, US border policing is often the least of Central American 
migrants' worries. 
Criminal territory bosses are not the only non-state actors who attempt 
to dominate migrants. Despite their shared enemies of the state and 
dangerous criminal terrain bosses, smugglers have also long been infa­
mous for the exploitation of their clients, imposing control over migrants. 
This is perhaps even truer today than in the past. Even in early periods of 
border crossing, smugglers had been known to threaten and intimidate 
female migrants into having unwanted sexual relations. Smugglers may 
not keep promises about travel and living conditions en route, subjecting 
migrants to more suffering than expected. Smugglers sometimes steal 
from and cheat migrants, abandoning them in dangerous places along 
the route. They may sell their human cargo to traffickers. Smugglers may 
collaborate with kidnappers, who demand ransoms from family members 
in the United States without delivering them there. Finally, smugglers 
may suddenly attempt to renegotiate their contract with the migrant at a 
vulnerable moment during the journey, extorting more money than the 
original agreement had entailed. 
At some point during the journey, virtually all Central American migrants 
experience a deprivation of liberty at the hands of their smuggler, even when 
the migrant- smuggler contract is consensual, rather than the outcome of a 
kidnapping.43 Migrants may be locked inside a hidden compartment of a 
vehicle, incapable of escaping if conditions turn dangerously hot or oxygen­
deprived. They may be locked in an unsanitary drop house with other 
migrants for days or weeks to wait for an opportune moment to make the 
43 For an in-depth discussion of these moments of immobility during mobility during 
migrant journeys, see Brigden and Mainwaring 2016. 
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next segment of the journey, or to wait for a payment to the smuggler from 
US-based relatives. 
It should be pointed out that this predatory protean power, benefiting 
smugglers as well as other criminal organizations, ultimately contributes 
to the US policy goal of making the border harder for migrants to cross 
( even as migrants rely on smugglers and the bribing of criminal organiza­
tions to make it across the border). In this way, predatory protean power 
serves as an unintended accomplice in control power objectives. 
Nevertheless, migrants are not powerless. They resist smugglers and 
kidnappers. Escape stories abound, as migrants flee buildings that are 
poorly equipped to hold hundreds of captives or take advantage of drun­
ken debauchery during football matches or holidays to slip past inebriated 
guards. In interviews, a migrant found a window in a bathroom, another 
carefully learned the schedule of his captors, and yet another broke 
through a shoddily constructed wall to find freedom. Acts of collective 
resistance also erupt in these drop houses, and in one particularly dra­
matic story, migrants grabbed pitchforks and shards of broken glass to 
defend themselves against armed assailants.44 Migrants may submit to 
their captors outwardly in appearance only, but continue to conspire 
quietly to regain their freedom. 
However, protean power comes at a terrible cost for many migrants. 
The Honduran man, Maynard, who told the dramatic story of resisting 
kidnappers with pitchforks and broken glass wept when he remembered 
how the kidnappers beheaded his co-conspirator; their plan had been 
discovered prematurely, because a particularly hungry captive had 
informed on them in exchange for food rations. It had been the second 
time Maynard had been betrayed by another migrant; a Honduran 
"friend" had sold him to the kidnappers. Other migrants who survived 
kidnappings wept, rather than congratulate themselves on their 
impressive feats of resistance and wit, as they thought of the people 
left behind or the expense of the ransoms to their families. Migrants 
often do not experience a sense of empowerment from their capacity to 
negotiate a humiliating, morally compromising and physically difficult 
journey. 
The physical sacrifices of the journey art; common knowledge across the 
region, leaving lasting scars on the bodies of border crossers. For those that 
survive the passage, the price of protean power still potentially includes 
extreme hunger and malnutrition, exposure to the elements or wildlife, 
illness from contaminated water, suffering assaults, disembodiment from 
44 Interview, Mexico, March 12, 2010. 
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falls from the train, and injuries in the desert. However, these scars often 
run deeper than the skin and bones of a migrant. 
The trauma of the journey can leave lasting soci~ and moral traces in 
the psyche of border crossers. Even the most successful border crossers 
must lie or alienate themselves from loved ones to survive. A 
Salvadoran woman, Ana, traveled with her two small children and a 
military-age nephew across Mexico in the late 1980s.45 She tearfully 
described the ethical dilemmas she faced in transit. Her husband had 
already fled due to political persecution during the civil war. Her 
nephew had been a low-ranking infantryman, and he deserted to flee 
the violence. On the way north, they boarded a bus, pretending to be 
Mexican. The guide kept them separate, and told them that they must 
all act like strangers. Her nephew was sitting a few seats from her when 
police boarded the bus and took him away. At this point in the story, 
Ana wept remembering how she could only assume that he was being 
led away to his death, "Imagine pretending you don't know your own 
nephew ... But that is how it is on the road." To survive, she had to 
momentarily disavow her kin, silently watching him be led to potential 
slaughter. 46 She thereby maintained her disguise and continued north, 
exercising her power to move and protecting her children, but at a 
terrible emotional and, in Ana's interpretation, moral cost. Her power 
to migrate was inexorably tied to her acceptance of her powerlessness to 
help her nephew. 
Later in the journey, Ana traveled in a private car with her children 
and smuggler. Before passing through the highway migration check­
point, Ana and her smuggler had to coach her young son. The smuggler 
instructed the boy to say he was his father if anyone asked. The seven­
year-old boy became indignant at the suggestion, "You are not my 
father! My father is in the US and we are going to him!" The smuggler 
was patient, but the situation was critical. The boy had to be taught how 
to lie. While interviewing her, Ana shook her head with sadness at the 
memory of threatening her son to dissuade him from telling the truth. 
While she did not say it aloud, perhaps, her thoughts briefly skipped 
ahead to the rebellious young man he later became, a regret that she had 
discussed on other occasions. Deception is part of the power that 
migrants can draw upon, but they do so at a cost. In Ana's estimation, 
she paid with her son's virtue and her own responsibility as his mother. 
Teaching her son to lie went against her principles as a mother and a 
45 Interviews, El Salvador, November II, 2009 and January 14, 2010. 
46 The nephew began the journey again as soon as he returned, and he arrived safely in the 
United States on his second tty. 
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devout Catholic, but morality must be bent (in this case, somewhat 
gently) in the realm of protean power. 
However traumatizing the journey might be for Ana, telling lies to 
migration police is one of the lesser moral quandaries that migrants face 
in transit today. In the contemporary context, migrants may be forced to 
collaborate with criminal terrain bosses and kidnappers. A small minority of 
migrants become spies infiltrating the migration stream. They lead groups 
of migrants into ambush or monitor the activities of human rights activists, 
smugglers, and other migrants for criminal bosses. These co-opted 
migrants become the eyes and feet of criminal networks along the smug­
glingroute. Migrants' capacity to go undetected among their co-nationals is 
a form of protean power that comes from the ability to cleverly disguise 
intentions and improvise upon social expectations and stereotypes to forge 
new relationships. In tum, this protean power serves as a resource for 
criminal territory bosses to exen control power over the smuggling route. 
Such protean power enables the migrant's survival and mobility, but at the 
expense of others. 
This form of collaboration represents neither outright resistance nor 
acceptance of the control power of the state. Such collaboration on 
the part of migrants is a survival tactic that mirrors relationships that 
form across a variety of violent settings, generating what Primo Levi calls 
a "grey zone," where distinctions between victims and perpetrators 
become blurry. 47 The fact that this power comes at the price of solidarity 
among Central Americans and an increase in the suffering of a vulnerable 
population does not go unnoticed by migrants. As a Honduran woman 
ruefully lamented, "They are us, same as us: Hondurans, Guatemalans, 
Salvadorans. My own paisanos are those that rob. That's why you can't 
trust people in the [Catholic migrant] shelter either." The Honduran 
woman turned to a Guatemalan girl next to her, "You don't know who 
they are, your own paisanos. " 48 Indeed, a sense of betrayal often accom­
panies the experience of the journey. A shadowy world of mistrust, 
chameleon-like characters, and ephemeral alliances is the price of protean 
power. 
. 
Conclusion: Protean Power and Predation 
As this chapter has suggested, protean power should not simply be 
equated with "empowerment." It is worth noting that migrants them­
selves do not celebrate protean power. They would much rather see a 
dramatic immigration policy change than be forced to improvise a terrible 
47 Levi 1988. 48 Interview, Mexico, April 11, 2010. 
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and dangerous clandestine journey. They would rather the state leave 
them alone than be forced to respond to it with jigility and ingenuity. In 
fact, ·the practices in which they must engage during the journey are often 
experienced as profoundly disempowering and dehumanizing. As 
Maria's and Ana's stories suggest, survival often requires painful com­
promises of morality or extraordinary physical sacrifices. 
Protean power is not a form of solidarity that promises to bring us to 
a more just or equitable world. It is a fragmented force that enables 
some individuals to navigate a path to the United States, but does not 
address the larger socio-economic and political structures that moti­
vate migrant journeys and shape the migration route. Predatory pat­
terns emerge from protean power generated by some migrants as they 
survive violence at the expense of their compatriots. Such predation 
may thwart some political projects and undermine a sense of shared 
identity. Furthermore, protean power seems better fit for creative 
resistance of control than to capturing and controlling the direction 
of state policy. 
As far as migrants are concerned, "weapons of the weak" are a distant 
second best to a US immigration policy revolution. For this reason, Reece 
Jones calls everyday practices that transgress state boundaries, but with­
out an overt political motivation, a form of "refusal" rather than 
"resistance. "49 Such activities are disruptive and have structural effects, 
but their participants do not necessarily understand them as resistance or 
empowerment. Protean power clearly complicates control power. 
Nevertheless, control power also necessitates and, in an important 
sense, generates its own antithesis in protean power. Likewise, protean 
power constitutes control power. When viewed through the lens of 
experience, even the state requires the protean power of individuals to 
implement its control. Finally, given the perverse escalation spirals that 
sometimes emerge from the interaction of the two forms of power, the 
future structural effects of protean power remain unclear, and may ulti­
mately reinforce control power rather than undermine it. Nevertheless, 
protean power is creative and, thus, a form of agency that cannot be 
overlooked if we wish to understand the dynamic process of control and 
evasion at the border. 
Indeed, using different levels of analysis, we have explored the interac­
tion of control power and protean power, showing how their collision has 
produced a humanitarian catastrophe at the border, not just a failure to 
curb migration. Ifwe only look from the top down at the border, we see a 
mirage of control that might be heralded as a victory for policing. 
49 Jones 2012. 
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Nonetheless, it is a pyrrhic victory of control power, representing a 
decrease in the visibility of an otherwise continuous flow of unauthorized 
migrants across the US-Mexico line. Nor, however, can continued bor­
der crossings be heralded as a victory of protean power. If we look through 
an ethnographic lens from the bottom up, where protean power becomes 
visible for individuals, we have seen the true consequences of the attempt 
to impose control: dramatically intensified human suffering. The inter­
action of control with protean power produces this tragic outcome. 
Shifting the line of sight of our analysis brings the tragedy, as well as the 
victory, of protean power into focus. Border guards and border crossers 
both experience profound uncertainty and risk, and ethnographic meth­
ods bring this experiential level into view. Thus, for the contemporary 
period, we augment our historical analysis with ethnographic research on 
the day-to-day experience of Central American migrants attempting to 
clandestinely reach and cross the US- Mexico border. 
From this analysis, we find that at key moments control power is 
constituted by protean power. We can see this complementarity when 
we move up and down the levels of analysis from collective actors to 
practice. At the level of practice, the state generates the protean power 
as its individual immigration agents exert control power at the border. 
These improvised practices constitute the state, and the protean power 
generated by individuals engaged in such improvisations constitutes the 
state's control power. Similarly, organized gangs that control territory 
i:equire the protean power of individual criminals, that is, the smugglers, 
look-outs, enforcers, and others. Moving up and down the levels of 
analysis shows us how protean power complements, and in some ways 
creates spaces for the operation of ~ontrol power. 
In other moments, control power and protean power of various actors 
interact, leading to a spiral of intensification with yet unpredictable out­
comes. As the state exerts control power, it calls protean power into 
existence. Necessity is the mother of invention, and border control is 
the mother of improvised smuggling and migration practice. The protean 
power generated by migrants and smugglers then destabilizes the fa~ade 
of control, justifying further control effort by the state. We see this inter-
action by moving across history. · 
Although beyond the scope of this chapter, this type of analysis could 
be extended to the recent plight of African and Middle Eastern 
migrants attempting to enter Europe. Attempts to control illegal traffic 
across the Mediterranean have had an ambiguous, and often counter­
productive, impact on clandestine flows. An unrelenting unauthorized 
traffic drifts north from the northern African coastline. For the last two 
decades of policing intensification, the bodies of failed border crossers 
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have washed ashore on European beaches alongside tourists. While a 
massive allocation of resources to fortify the E~opean continent against 
these flows has not succeeded in stemming the tide of contraband and 
migration,50 it has dramatically restructured the lived experience of migra­
tion in ways similar to those survived by Central American migrants seek­
ing to enter the United States.51 The geographic focal points,52 social 
relationships, and smuggling networks53 that underpin routes adapt to 
policing. 
Since the 1990s, the Mediterranean crossing has grown more danger­
ous for unauthorized migrants, 54 especially in recent years. In response 
to the Syrian refugee crisis and a recent series of high-profile calamities 
suffered by boat migrants during clandestine passages, NATO ships 
have been deployed to the Aegean Sea to deter human smuggling. 55 
Our analysis leads to the expectation that, despite its humanitarian 
justifications, these militarized deterrence efforts will lead to a formid­
able increase of suffering, but ultimately prove incapable of halting 
clandestine flows into Europe. Instead, the complex collision between 
the control power of the state and the protean power generated by 
migrants will likely continue to expand and intensify on the periphery 
of Europe. 
Our chapter has shown how a ground-level line of sight helps us to son 
out precisely these complex effects of power on diverse actors and their 
relationships. We find that different forms of power alternate, cross­
cutting between empowerment and disempowennent at key moments in 
interactions between state actors, smugglers, migrants, and criminal 
territory bosses. Furthermore, the ground-level line of sight, at the 
level of experience, brings surprising instances of protean power into 
view, sometimes constituting the control power exerted by collective 
actors like the state. In this way, we complicate the dichotomy between 
state- non-state actors and their relationship to control- protean power. 
Recently, much to the chagrin oflow-ranking smugglers, more powerful 
criminal actors have imposed control over clandestine flows through 
their terrain. The tightened control of terrain by criminal bosses repre­
sents a new iteration of, and increasingly complex interplay between, 
control and protean power. Migrants must sometimes resist the control 
of their own smugglers, and the very existence of smuggling as a profes­
sion is predicated on the imperfect but potent control power of the 
state and now criminal territory bosses. Power reverberates in often 
50 Anderson 2000; Andreas 2009. 51 Brigden and Mainwaring 201 6. 52 Carr 2015. 
53 Collyer 2010. 54 Albahari 201 5; Carling 2007; IOM 2014. 
55 Schmidt and Chan 2016. 
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unpredictable ways through these layered and shifting relationships 
between the state, smugglers, territory bosses, and migrants, as experi­
enced by the individuals implicated within them. Across the US­
Mexico border and across the globe, states have tightened enforcement, 
thereby restructuring these layered and ·shifting relationships, intensify­
ing the experience of uncenainty along clandestine routes, and often 
unwittingly complicating (though not undoing) control power by calling 
protean power into existence. 
